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Market Indicators, Bank 
Fragility, and Indirect 
Market Discipline
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
rom a supervisory perspective, the prices of securities
issued by banks are interesting because they may 
complement or even be a substitute for traditional accounting 
data in assessing bank fragility. Market prices may efficiently 
summarise all available information in one convenient 
indicator. Moreover, market information is available at a very 
high frequency. Market information is also inherently more 
forward looking than accounting data. Hence, it has been 
proposed that supervisors use these signals as screening devices 
or inputs into early-warning models geared at identifying 
banks, which should be more closely scrutinised.1
This paper aims to ascertain the quality (that is, the 
predictive power and prediction errors) of two market 
indicators: the distance to default and the subordinated debt 
spread. Previous work has established that banks’ market 
prices reflect contemporaneous information about bank risk 
in the United States and in Europe.2 In our study, we first 
examine the theoretical properties of the indicators, namely, 
whether or not they are aligned with the conservative 
objectives of supervisors. We propose that in order to be 
aligned with these objectives, market indicators of bank 
fragility should be decreasing in earnings expectations, and 
increasing in earnings volatility and leverage. Using simple 
option-pricing theory, we show that the subordinated debt 
spread and the negative distance to default do indeed satisfy 
these properties.3 We also find that the signal-to-noise ratio of 
subordinated debt spreads should be quite low far away from 
the default point of the bank. We then summarise the results 
obtained in Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002), which suggest 
that both indicators may have some usefulness in predicting 
bank fragility in the European Union (EU).
Based on two different econometric models—a logit model  
and a proportional hazard model—our results show that the 
negative distance to default predicts downgrades between six 
and eighteen months in advance and that the predictive 
properties are quite poor the closer to failure. In contrast, the 
predictive powers of spreads diminish beyond twelve months 
prior to a downgrade. The analysis also indicates that spreads 
are useful predictors only for banks, which are not implicitly 
insured against default, while the public safety net does not 
appear to affect the predictive power of the distance to default.
Furthermore, our results suggest that the distance to default 
provides some additional information relative to accounting 
variables, while this is not so for the spread. We also find 
support for the notion that the two indicators together have 
more discriminatory power in predicting failures than each 
does alone. In particular, “Type II” errors (a sound bank 
classified as weak) are reduced in a model that includes both 
market-based indicators. Similarly, market indicators reduce 
Type II errors relative to a model using accounting data alone. 
Hence, the use of market indicators may prevent supervisors 
from chasing false leads.
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The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 briefly summarises the previous empirical literature. 
In Section 3, we present our main theoretical results, and in 
Section 4 we offer a summary of the empirical results obtained 
in Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002).
2. Previous Literature
A number of recent papers studying U.S. banks are closely 
related to our work. Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2001) find that 
stock prices exhibit a downward trend as many as two years 
before a supervisory CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) rating downgrade to 3, 
4, or 5. Also, adding market variables to standard equations 
containing call report financial data improves their predictive 
power, especially for banks in the greatest financial distress. 
Evanoff and Wall (2001) find that accounting information has 
almost no predictive power for CAMEL and BOPEC (Bank 
subsidiaries, Other nonbank subsidiaries, Parent company, 
Earnings, and Capital adequacy) supervisory rating 
downgrades, but subordinated debt spreads perform only 
slightly better. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) examine 
the relationship between supervisory information and a 
number of market indicators (rating changes, abnormal stock 
returns, and the proportion of equity owned by institutional 
investors and bank insiders). They find that supervisory 
assessments and bond ratings are at least partially able to 
predict each other, whereas supervisory assessments and equity 
indicators are not.
DeYoung et al. (2001) take the opposite approach and 
examine whether on-site examinations produce information 
that affects market prices. They find that this information is 
only gradually incorporated in banks’ bond spreads, with 
particularly poor supervisory assessments reducing spreads 
and vice versa. They suggest that markets rely on supervisory 
discipline as a substitute for market discipline. Krainer and 
Lopez (forthcoming) investigate whether market prices 
contain additional information over accounting variables in 
predicting BOPEC rating changes. They answer this question 
in the affirmative, but caution that there is no improvement in 
out-of-sample forecasts. Interestingly, they find that debt 
market indicators have predictive power close to a downgrade 
only, while equity prices react much earlier, which is in line 
with the theoretical predictions obtained below. Furthermore, 
Bliss and Flannery (2002) suggest that the fact that market 
prices reflect bank risk does not necessarily imply that they 
discipline managers’ behaviour (“monitoring” versus 
“influencing”). For a sample of U.S. banks, they find mixed 
evidence of significant influencing. 
Our study focuses on equity prices in addition to spreads 
and highlights the importance of a careful selection of an 
appropriate equity market indicator. Signals based on equity 
prices have been considered ill suited for supervisors, because 
equityholders benefit from the upside gains that accrue from 
increased risk taking, leading to increased asset volatility. 
However, we show that the negative distance to default is 
increasing in asset volatility and thus is an appropriate risk 
indicator. There are several other aspects suggesting that equity 
prices, properly adjusted, may be attractive monitoring 
devices. First, there is broad consensus that the equity markets 
are quite efficient in processing available information. Second, 
while bond spreads are conceptually simple, their imple-
mentation is difficult. For example, Hancock and Kwast (2001) 
find that different bonds issued by the same U.S. bank may 
yield different estimates of the spread. In the European context, 
the construction of appropriate risk-free benchmarks, which is 
a necessary ingredient to the calculation of spreads, may also be 
difficult, especially for smaller countries.
3. Some Properties of the Distance 
to Default and the Subordinated 
Debt Spread
For market indicators to yield useful information for 
supervisors, they must provide easily interpretable signals. We 
propose that for this to occur, at a minimum the indicator must 
give a signal of increased fragility: 1) if the bank’s asset values 
decline, 2) if asset volatility increases, and 3) if leverage 
increases. In other words, a useful market indicator should be 
decreasing in earnings, and increasing in earnings volatility and 
leverage. It is well known that the firm’s stock price generally 
does not satisfy criteria 2 and 3 (due to the call option implicit 
in equity) and hence is not considered a suitable indicator for 
supervisors. In this section, we use option-pricing theory in the 
valuation of equity and debt securities to demonstrate that the 
distance to default and the subordinated debt spread do satisfy 
the criteria.
For simplicity, we consider a bank liability structure that 
consists of equity (E) and junior subordinated debt ( ) as well 
as some senior debt (I). At the maturity date (T), payments can 
only be made to the junior claimants if the full face value has 
been paid to the senior debtholders. Suppose that both classes 
of debt securities are discount bonds and that the promised 
payments (book values) are I and  , respectively. The total 
amount of debt liabilities then equals ( ). To simplify 
the notation, we assume that time to maturity equals T at the 
time of valuation of the equity and debt securities. We further 
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assume normal asset value diffusion and European option type 
(call for equity and put for debt). The market value of a debt 
instrument can then be expressed on the basis of the 
discounted value assuming no default risk and the value of a 
put option on the firm’s assets (see Merton [1977] and Ron and 
Verma [1989]).4
3.1 Derivation of the Distance to Default 
In the Black and Scholes (1973) model, the time path of the 
market value of assets follows a stochastic process of the form:5
(1)                ,
which gives the asset value at time T (maturity of debt), given 
its current value,  , and its standard deviation,  . The 
random component of the firm’s return on assets is denoted by 
, which is standard normal. The risk-free rate is r. The current 
distance d from the default point (where  ) can be 
expressed as:
(2)    <=>
                             .
That is, the distance to default, DD 
(3 )                
represents the number of standard deviations that the firm is 
from the default point. DD depends on   and  . Though 
unobservable, these parameters can be calculated from the 
observable market value of equity capital ( ) and the 
volatility of equity ( ) using the system of equations below:
(3 )                     
                             ,
                             
                             .
In order to yield a fragility indicator, we consider the 
negative of the distance to default (-DD) for which the 
following result holds.
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Result 1: 
Given D, (-DD) is decreasing in  , and increasing in   and
, iff  , where .
Proof: 
Clearly,   and .
,
iff  .
Hence, (-DD) satisfies our minimum requirements for a 
useful indicator of bank fragility as long as the market value of 
assets is not less than total discounted future debt service. If 
asset values fall below this threshold, the distance to default 
may decrease with asset volatility. The empirical evidence 
reported later suggests that the usefulness of this indicator does 
decline for banks close to default (or at least in serious financial 
difficulty).
3.2 Derivation of the Subordinated
Debt Spread
In determining the value of subordinated debt spreads, it is 
important to account for subordination explicitly, since the 
payoff profile of the subordinated debt is different from that of 
the senior debt. Following Black and Cox (1976), the market 
value of subordinated debt ( ) can be derived as a difference 
between two senior debt securities with the face values of 
()  a n d  I, and respective market values of ( ) and ( ):
(4) .
The value of the individual senior debt securities can be 
expressed using the standard Merton (1990) option-pricing 
formula. By letting L denote the leverage ratio, that is, 
, where  , the value of the debt security 
 equals: 
(5)    ,
                    ,
                    .
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The other senior security (I) is valued as: 
                    ,
with h1(I) and h2(I) defined as in equation 5. Finally, the yield 
to maturity, y(T), of subordinated debt is defined as:
(6)    , i.e.,  ,
and the spread over and above the risk-free yield to maturity of 
the subordinated debt (S) equals y(T)-r(T). The way it is 
defined here, S is equivalent to a credit risk premium, in the 
absence of any liquidity premia. Based on equations 5 and 6, we 
obtain:
Result 2:




Following Merton (1990),   and
. 
Thus,  . The expression in 
the brackets is always positive because  . 
Since   and   are always positive, .
Second,  . 
Since  , .
Third,  . Thus, the sign of   is the opposite 
of the sign of  . According to Black and Cox (1976, p. 360),  
is a decreasing (increasing) function of   for   greater than 
(less than) the point of inflection,  . Thus, for  , 
.6
Result 2 implies that the spread signals an increase in bank 
fragility only as long as the value of bank assets covers both 
senior and junior debt. If the asset value falls below this 
threshold, the interests of junior claimants resemble those of 
equityholders.
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3.3 Value of Insured Debt
Following Merton (1977), the value of subordinated debt can 
be expressed in terms of two “no-default-risk” values for the 
senior debt securities   and I and two put option values 




denotes the no-default-risk value and   the value of the put 
option. A put option represents the value of the limited 
liability, that is, the right of equityholders to walk away from 
their debts in exchange for handing over the firm’s assets to the 
creditors.
In the case of fully insured debt (such as insured deposits), 
the put option component disappears and the market value of 
the debt equals the no-default-risk value (and S is zero). The 
put option value also represents the value of the deposit 
insurance guarantee, since by guaranteeing the debt the 
guarantor has in fact issued the put option on the assets (see 
Merton [1977]). Hence, the deposit insurance value ( ) 
could also be used as a bank fragility indicator (see Bongini, 
Laeven, and Majnoni [2002]) with the same characteristics as 
the market value of debt-based indicators. In case the explicit 
safety net is restricted, while the implicit safety net is perceived 
to be unrestricted, the value of the put option is also zero, since 
the debtholders would not face the risk of having to take over 
the assets of the bank.
3.4 Relationship between the Spread 
and the Distance to Default
Further note that the indicators may differ with respect to the 
strength of their reaction to a shock moving the bank closer to 
the default point. Based on the standard Black and Cox (1976) 
model, the spread is a convex and decreasing function of   for 
 and would remain close to zero and rather stable for 
large changes in V. A significant reaction of the spread would 
only be measurable close to the default point.7 Unless the bank 
is quite close to default, for S the signal-to-noise ratio may be 
quite low. The distance to default, by contrast, should react to 
adverse shocks even when default is still remote.
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Source: Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002). 
Notes: Coefficients are from a standard logit model, with the 
maximum normalised to 1. DD is the negative distance to default; 
S is the spread of subordinated debt relative to a government bond; 
“time to default” measures the time until a downgrade in the 
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Source: Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002). 
Note: DD is the negative distance to default; S is the spread of 
subordinated debt relative to a government bond; x measures 
the time until a downgrade in the Fitch/IBCA individual rating 








4. Empirical Results from EU Banks
Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002) test whether the two 
indicators do in fact have predictive power for bank fragility in 
a sample of EU banks. In the absence of bank failures and 
internal supervisory ratings in Europe, they measure bank 
fragility as a downgrade to C or below in the Fitch/IBCA 
individual rating of the bank. The Fitch/IBCA individual rating 
measures the quality of the bank, explicitly excluding the safety 
net—that is, the likelihood that the bank would receive 
support, either from official sources or from a parent. They 
find that in virtually all cases, a downgrade to C or below is 
associated with some eventual restructuring of the bank or with 
some public intervention within a year. The authors compile a 
sample of eighty-four banks, for which they have sufficient data 
to calculate the distance to default, and fifty-nine banks, for 
which they can calculate the subordinated debt spread. Of the 
eighty-four banks in the equity sample, twenty-six were 
downgraded to C or below during the sample period of 
1990-2001. In the bond sample, there were twenty-two such 
downgrades.8 
The authors estimate logit models with horizons of three, 
six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months, as well as a 
proportional hazard model. First, they test for unconditional 
predictive ability of the two indicators.9 They find that the 
negative distance to default has significant predictive ability of 
a downgrade up to eighteen months ahead.10 The spread 
predicts downgrades only if the sample excludes: 1) U.K. banks 
(U.K. banks have significantly higher spreads relative to banks 
of equal quality in continental Europe)11 and 2) banks that are 
likely to be covered by the public safety net. The likelihood of 
support is measured by the Fitch/IBCA support rating, which 
indicates the likelihood of public or parent bank support on a 
scale of 1 to 4. The predictive ability of the negative distance 
to default is unaffected by the safety net, suggesting that 
equityholders assign a low probability of being rescued along 
with debtholders in case of bank default. All of these results are 
in line with the predictions of the theoretical analysis presented 
above.
Chart 1 shows the patterns of the predictive ability of the 
two indicators. It presents the coefficients from the logit 
estimation, with the largest coefficient normalised to 1 
(normalising reveals where the indicators reach maximum 
predictive power). The results confirm that spreads only have 
predictive ability shortly before the downgrade, whereas 
negative distances to default indicate problems with much 
longer lead times. As we argue above, we attribute the poorer 
predictive ability of the spread further away from the 
downgrade to the poor signal-to-noise ratio as long as the bank 
is very far away from serious difficulties.
Chart 2 plots the proportion of “Type I” and “Type II” 
classification errors for the two indicators. Both indicators 
predict downgrades accurately 60 and 80 percent of the time. 
For example, Chart 1 shows that the spread’s predictive power 
seems greatest six months ahead of the downgrade. At that 
horizon, spreads predict with slightly more than 60 percent 58 Market Indicators, Bank Fragility
Chart 3
Classification Accuracy and Discriminatory Power 










Source: Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002). 
Notes: A high spread is defined as more than 98 basis points; 
a low spread is less than 98 basis points relative to the comparable 
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Source: Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002). 
Note: Low distance to default (DD) is defined as less than 3.2 standard 
deviations from the default point; high DD is more than 3.2 standard 






accuracy. The negative distance to default predicts with slightly 
more than 70 percent accuracy twelve months before the 
downgrade.12 The superior performance of the negative 
distance to default reflects fewer Type I errors, meaning that it 
does a better job of picking up downgrades correctly (“false 
negatives”). The Type II error, which reflects “false positives,” 
that is, cases in which the indicator signaled “downgrade” and 
no downgrade followed, is around 20 percent for both 
indicators.
The different performance of the two indicators at varying 
horizons suggests that using both indicators may be better than 
using just one or the other. At the six-month horizon, the 
combined indicators have an overall accuracy of more than 
80 percent; at the twelve-month horizon, the overall accuracy 
improves to more than 90 percent. The improved predictive 
ability reflects the contribution of the negative distance to 
default at longer horizons and yields a reduction in Type II 
errors to less than 10 percent.
We also examine classification accuracy by using a 
proportional hazard model. In such a model, what matters is 
whether the indicator adds information over time. Chart 3 
plots the probability of survival for a bank with a high spread, 
the probability of survival for a bank with a low spread, and the 
difference between the two (“discriminatory power”). The 
discriminatory power increases over time, from slightly more 
than 20 percent after six months to more than 80 percent after 
thirty-six months. After thirty-six months, the spread tends to 
add little new information, because all banks with a high spread 
had been downgraded by then. The patterns for the distance to 
default look substantially different (Chart 4). The distance to 
default has little discriminatory power for twenty-four months. 
After that, it slowly increases to 25 percent. Because of their 
higher volatility, distances to default have to be observed much 
longer than spreads do in order to extract meaningful 
information. 
Chart 5 summarises the comparison in Gropp, Vesala, and 
Vulpes (2002) of the predictive ability of market indicators and 
accounting information. Using an imaginary CAMEL rating 
constructed for each bank from publicly available data, they 
find that the CAMEL rating alone identifies downgrades twelve 
months ahead with 78 percent accuracy. Adding spreads 
increases accuracy to 82 percent, while adding spreads and the FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2004 59
Chart 5
Classification Accuracy CAMEL Ratings, 








CAMEL+S+DD CAMEL+DD CAMEL only
Source: Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002).
Notes: A “Type I” error is defined as a misclassified downgrade 
(classified by the model as a no downgrade); a “Type II” error is 
defined as a misclassified nondowngrade (a bank that was not 
downgraded was classified as a downgrade). DD is negative distance 
to default; S is spread; CAMEL is Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 








negative distance to default raises accuracy to 84 percent. The 
marginal improvement from the market indicators is entirely 
due to a reduction in Type II errors. Even if the gain in accuracy 
is small, the benefit to supervisors from avoiding false warnings 
may be quite valuable. 
5.C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
This paper examines the theoretical properties of various 
debt and equity indicators as signals of bank fragility. We 
demonstrate that the negative distance to default and the 
subordinated debt spread satisfy the minimal requirements of 
a useful indicator: both signal increased fragility as bank asset 
values decline and as asset volatility and leverage rise. We show 
that the distance to default should be informative even when 
default is remote, whereas the signal in spreads should be low 
when default is far off (due to the payoff structure of sub-
ordinated debt). To the extent that subordinated debtholders 
are covered by a safety net, the signal from subordinated debt 
spreads is weakened.
We also summarise Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes’ (2002) 
empirical tests of these properties for a sample of European 
banks. The results support using both indicators to detect 
future bank fragility. The distance to default predicts 
downgrades between six and eighteen months in advance, but 
its predictive properties are poor when failure is close. In 
contrast, the spread’s predictive powers are poor when failure 
is far off, but improve as failure approaches. Spreads are not 
useful for banks that are implicitly covered by a government 
safety net, but the safety net does not seem to reduce the 
predictive power of the distance to default. Moreover, both 
indicators provide additional information relative to 
accounting data alone in the case of distance to default and 
little or no extra information in the case of spreads. 
Furthermore, proportional hazard models suggest that the 
distance to default needs to be monitored longer before the 
signal becomes reliable. These models are preferable to logit 
models because they waste less information. Forecasts from 
hazard models are also shown to improve with the length of the 
monitoring period. The two indicators together have more 
discriminatory power in predicting failures than each does 
alone. Finally, our analysis of classification errors indicates that 
the main value of market indicators is to reduce Type II (false 
positive) errors.Endnotes
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1. The use of market indicators by supervisors is commonly referred 
to as “indirect market discipline.” This is in addition to the direct 
discipline that markets may impose upon banks (see, for example, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [1999]).
2. Numerous studies relate U.S. secondary bond and/or stock market 
data to bank risk: Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996), Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997), Jagtiani, 
Kaufman, and Lemieux (2000), and Flannery (1998, 2001). In 
addition, Morgan and Stiroh (2001) relate U.S. primary bond market 
data to bank risk, Sironi (2003) relates European primary bond 
market data to bank risk, and Gropp and Richards (2001) relate 
European secondary bond and equity market data to bank risk. With 
few exceptions, all studies tend to find a significant relationship 
between market prices and risk, although risk and market prices are 
measured in different ways and the methodologies may differ 
substantially.
3. This is in contrast to simple stock prices, for example, which are 
increasing in earnings, increasing in earnings volatility, and increasing 
in leverage.
4. This result may not be robust to different (and possibly more 
plausible) distributional assumptions, for example, based on bounded 
returns (Bliss 2000); more complex liability structures; or under 
different option types, such as barrier options (Bergman, Grundy, and 
Weiner 1996). The analysis also relies on the idea that asset risk can be 
measured by asset variance, which seems to be relatively uncontested, 
while alternative approaches have also been proposed (for example, 
Harrison and Kreps [1979]).
5. See KMV Corporation (1999) for a similar derivation and more 
ample discussions. 
6. Note that   as long as there is some junior debt outstanding.
7. Bruche (2001) shows that the “hockey-stick” shape of the spread as 
a function of V can become more pronounced when one introduces 
into the basic pricing model asymmetric information and investors’ 
coordination failure.
8. For more details on the sample, see Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes 
(2002).
9. To facilitate comparisons across indicators, the regressions use -DD 
rather than DD.
10. Interestingly, Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002) find no significant 
predictive ability of the distance to default three months before the 
downgrade. They propose a number of possible explanations for this 
surprising finding, including a reduction in equity volatility right 
before the downgrade and greater heterogeneity in the volatility before 
the downgrade (resulting in a noisier signal).
11. This is not a new finding. Sironi (2003) reaches the same 
conclusion using a sample of primary spreads.
12. It turns out that this rate is somewhat better than at eighteen 
months before the downgrade.
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